Abstract: A zero-sum linear-convex differential game with a quality index that estimates a set of deviations of a motion trajectory at given instants of time from given target points is considered. A case when the saddle point condition in a small game, also known as Isaac's condition, does not hold is studied. The game is posed in classes of mixed control strategies of players. A numerical method for computing the game value and optimal strategies is elaborated. Results of numerical experiments in model examples are given.
INTRODUCTION
We consider a zero-sum differential game (see, e.g., Krasovskii (1985) ; Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995) ). A dynamical system is described by ordinary differential equations that are linear with respect to the phase vector. The system is subjected to bounded control actions of two antagonistic players. The control process is evaluated within a fixed time interval. The quality index of the control process (the game payoff) is a norm of a set of deviations of the motion trajectory from given targets at given instants of time. In the case when the saddle point condition in a small game (see, e.g., Krasovskii (1985) ), also known as Isaac's condition, holds, the game has a value and a saddle point in classes of pure control strategies (Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995) ). In Lukoyanov (1997 Lukoyanov ( , 1998 a procedure for computing the game value by constructing upper convex hulls of auxiliary functions from the method of stochastic program synthesis (Krasovskii (1985) ) was proposed. On the basis of this procedure and the extremal shift (see, e.g., Krasovskii (1985) ; Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995) ) in Kornev (2012) a numerical method for solving differential games under such conditions was elaborated. This paper is devoted to the case when the saddle point condition in a small game does not necessarily hold. Under this assumption the considered differential game has a game value and a saddle point in classes of mixed strategies (see, e.g., Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995) ). Below we show that after the introduction of the socalled leader system the methods from Lukoyanov (1997 Lukoyanov ( , 1998 ; Kornev (2012) become applicable to solving games in mixed strategies. In the process of construction of the player's optimal control strategy we apply the extremal This work is supported by the Program of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Dynamical Systems and Control Theory" (12-P-1-1002) and by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (12-01-00290-a, 14-01-31319-mol a).
shift to provide necessary guarantees for the quality of the motion generated by the leader's deterministic control, while the proximity of the motions of the original system and the leader system is obtained by means of stochastic constructions from Krasovskii and Choi (2001) ; Krasovskii and Krasovskii (2012) .
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a differential game for a dynamical system, described by the following dynamic equatioṅ
initial condition
and quality index
Here x is a phase vector; t is time;ẋ(t) = dx(t)/dt; A(t) and f (t, u, v) are jointly continuous matrix function and vector function; u and v are values of control actions of the first and the second player; t 0 and ϑ are fixed instants of time; sets U and V are compact; ϑ i ∈ (t 0 , ϑ]: ϑ i+1 > ϑ i , i = 1, N − 1, ϑ N = ϑ, are given instants of time of the motion quality evaluation; D i are constant matrices with dimensions
It is assumed that there exist such norms µ i g i , . . . , g N and σ i (g i , µ), for which, for i = 1, N − 1,
In such a case (see Lukoyanov (1998) ) quality index γ is positional (Krasovskii and Krasovskii, 1995, p. 43) .
Realizations u(·) = u(t) ∈ U, t 0 ≤ t < ϑ and v(·) = v(t) ∈ V, t 0 ≤ t < ϑ are admissible if they are Borel-measurable. The system's motion x(·) generated by such realizations is an absolutely continuous function x(t) ∈ R n , t 0 ≤ t ≤ ϑ that satisfies initial condition (2) and together with u = u(t) and v = v(t) satisfies equation (1) for almost every t.
The aim of the first player is to make quality index (3) as small as possible. The aim of the second player is opposite.
Note that we do not assume that the saddle point condition in a small game holds for system (1), so there might exist such a vector l * ∈ R n , for which
where ·, · denotes the inner product of vectors. In such a case, differential game (1)-(3) might not have a value and a saddle point in pure strategies u(t, x, ε), v(t, x, ε), and it is appropriate to consider a formalization of the game in classes of mixed strategies (see, e.g., Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995) ). Here ε is an accuracy parameter, whose value is assigned by the player at the beginning of the process of forming the control actions and remains constant.
Since compact sets U and V can be approximated by finite sets, further we assume that U and V are finite initially:
Following constructions from Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995) , let us describe differential game (1)-(3) in mixed strategies from the point of view of the first player. Along with original x-object (1) consider an auxiliary y-model with a phase vector y ∈ R n . This y-model will be used as a leader (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988, p. 327) in the process of forming of the first player's control actions. The motion of the y-model is described by the equatioṅ
A mixed strategy S u of the first player is a triple
which are measurable with respect to x, y for fixed t, ε.
Within the formalization of differential game (1)-(3) in classes of mixed strategies players form their control realizations using probabilistic mechanisms. It is assumed that further constructions are based on a sufficiently rich probabilistic space Π = {Ω, F, P }, where Ω = {ω} is a sample space, F is a σ-algebra, P = P (B), B ∈ F is a probability measure. For explanations on formal construction of the appropriate space Π (see, e.g., (Krasovskii and Krasovskii, 1995, p. 250) , and also (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988, p. 402) ).
A control law U of the first player is a triple S u , ε, ∆ δ , where ∆ δ is a partition of the time interval [t 0 , ϑ]:
From given positions {t 0 , x 0 } of the x-object and {t 0 , y 0 } of the y-model the control law U in a pair with some admissible stochastic control realization v ω (·) = v ω (t) ∈ V, t 0 ≤ t < ϑ, ω ∈ Ω of the second player generates a stochastic motion {x ω (·), y ω (·)} of the {x-object, y-model} complex, which is defined as a solution of the following step-by-step equations:
where value u
ω ∈ U is determined as a result of a random trial under the condition
The symbol P (·|·) denotes the conditional probability. It is assumed that on each step t j ≤ t < t j+1 the realization v ω (·) is stochastically independent of the realization
A guaranteed result of the control law U, for fixed positions {t 0 , x 0 } and {t 0 , y 0 } and a number 0 < β < 1, is a value ρ(U; t 0 , x 0 , y 0 ; β) = sup
where the value γ of quality index (3) is calculated for the motion x ω (·).
A guaranteed result of the strategy S u , for a fixed initial position {t 0 , x 0 }, is a value
The value ρ 0 u (t 0 , x 0 ) is the optimal guaranteed result of the first player.
Similarly, considering differential game (1)-(3) from the point of view of the second player, we introduce an auxiliary z-model. Its motion is described by the following equation 
A mixed strategy S v of the second player is a triple
which are measurable with respect to x, z for fixed t, ε.
A control law V of the second player is a triple S v , ε, ∆ δ . From given positions {t 0 , x 0 } of the x-object and {t 0 , z 0 } of the z-model together with some admissible stochastic control realization u(·) = u ω (t) ∈ U, t 0 ≤ t < ϑ, ω ∈ Ω of the first player the control law V generates a stochastic motion {x ω (·), z ω (·)} of the {x-model, z-object} complex, which is defined as a solution of the step-by-step equationṡ
where the value v
ω ∈ V is determined as a result of a random trial under the condition
It is assumed that on each step t j ≤ t < t j+1 the realization u ω (·) is stochastically independent of the realization
A guaranteed result of the control law V, for fixed {t 0 , x 0 }, {t 0 , z 0 } and 0 < β < 1, is the following value ρ(V; t 0 , x 0 , z 0 ; β) = inf
Note that in accordance with definitions (8) and (12), for any admissible mixed control laws U and V, for any value 0.5 < β < 1, the following inequality holds ρ(U; t 0 , x 0 , y 0 ; β) ≥ ρ(V; t 0 , x 0 , z 0 = y 0 ; β).
A guaranteed result of the strategy S v is
is the optimal guaranteed result of the second player.
It is known (Krasovskii and Krasovskii, 1995, p. 257 ) that differential game (1)-(3) has a value
and a saddle point {S u 0 , S v 0 } in classes of mixed strategies. The aim of this paper is to elaborate a numerical method for approximate computation of the game value ρ(t 0 , x 0 ) and of the (ζ, β)-optimal control laws.
3. AUXILIARY DIFFERENTIAL GAME Consider a differential game for y-model (5) with quality index like (3):
In this auxiliary game p * is treated as control actions of the first player, who is aimed to minimize quality index (16), and q * is control actions of the second player, who is aimed to maximize this quality index.
System (5) satisfies the saddle point condition in a small game, that is why auxiliary game (5), (16) has a value ρ * (t 0 , y 0 ) and a saddle point {p * 0 (t, y, ε), q * 0 (t, y, ε)} in classes of pure strategies (Krasovskii, 1985, p. 228-234) . According to Lukoyanov (1997 Lukoyanov ( , 1998 , value ρ * (t 0 , y 0 ) can be calculated approximately by means of the following procedure. This procedure is based on a partition ∆ δ like (6). All instants of time ϑ i from quality index (16) are included in this partition.
Here Ψ[ϑ, t] is a fundamental solution matrix of the equationẋ = A(t)x such that Ψ[t, t] = E, where E is the identity matrix.
Step by step, in the reverse order, starting from the last point of the partition ∆ δ , we define sets G j of vectors m ∈ R n and scalar functions ϕ j (m), m ∈ G j , j = 0, k, by the following recurrent relations.
For j = k, we set
is not equal to any instant of time ϑ i of the motion quality evaluation, i.e., h(t j ) = h(t j+1 ), we set Finally, in any case, for m ∈ G j , we set 
Gj denotes the upper convex hull of the function ψ j on the set G j , i.e., the minimal concave function that majorizes ψ j (m) for m ∈ G j .
Consider the system of values e j (y) = max
(20) It is known (Lukoyanov (1998) ), that for any bounded subset Y 0 ⊂ R n and any number ξ > 0, there exists a number δ > 0 such that for any partition ∆ δ like (6), the following inequality holds |ρ
Put
A(t)x < +∞.
(22) Here and below · denotes the Euclidean vector norm.
On the basis of system of values (20) by means of extremal shift to accompanying points (see, e.g., Krasovskii (1985) ; Krasovskii and Krasovskii (1995) ) we define a function p * e u ( · ; ∆ δ ):
where
For auxiliary game (5), (16), consider a control law p * e u ( · ; ∆ δ ), ε, ∆ δ , that, basing on the partition ∆ δ used to construct (20), forms a piecewise constant control realization of the first player according to the rule p
As stated in Kornev (2012) , this control law is ζ-optimal. It means that for any bounded subset Y 0 ⊂ R n , for any number ζ > 0, there exist a number ε * y > 0 and a function δ y (ε) > 0, 0 < ε ≤ ε * y , such that, for any y 0 ∈ Y 0 , any value 0 < ε ≤ ε * y , and any partition ∆ δ , δ ≤ δ y (ε), the control law p * e u ( · ; ∆ δ ), ε, ∆ δ ensures the inequality
for any measurable q
On the other hand, considering the identical differential game for z-model (2) and quality index γ z like (16), basing on values (20), define a function q * e v ( · ; ∆ δ ):
Consider a corresponding control law q * e v ( · ; ∆ δ ), ε, ∆ δ , that forms a control realization for the second player according to the rule q * (t) = q * e v t j , z(t j ), ε; ∆ δ , t j ≤ t < t j+1 , j = 0, k − 1. For any bounded subset Z 0 ⊂ R n , for any number ζ > 0, there exist a number ε * z > 0 and a function δ z (ε) > 0, 0 < ε ≤ ε * z , such that, for any z 0 ∈ Z 0 , any value 0 < ε ≤ ε * z , and any partition ∆ δ , δ ≤ δ z (ε), the control law q * e
for any measurable p * (·) = p * (t) ∈ P, t 0 ≤ t < ϑ .
OBJECT-MODEL PROXIMITY
In original differential game (1)- (3) the first player during the process of forming the stochastic motion {x ω (·), y ω (·)} of complex (7) can ensure an appropriate proximity of x ω (·) and y ω (·) by means of a proper choice of functions p u (·) and q * u (·) in its mixed strategy S u .
On the other hand, by means of a proper choice of q v (·) and p * v (·) in the mixed strategy S v , the second player can ensure proximity of x ω (·) and z ω (·) for the corresponding motion {x ω (·), z ω (·)} of complex (11). Namely, the following lemmas are valid (see Krasovskii and Choi (2001) ; Krasovskii and Krasovskii (2012) ). Denote λ(t, x, y) = x − y 2 exp{−2λ
where constant λ A is taken from (22). Lemma 1. Let functions p u = p u (t, x, y, ε) and q * u = q * u (t, x, y, ε) from the mixed strategy of the first player
Then, for any bounded subset X 0 ⊂ R n and any numbers λ * > 0 and 0 < β < 1, there exist such values λ 0 > 0 and δ > 0, that, for any initial x 0 ∈ X 0 and y 0 ∈ R n , which satisfy the condition λ(t 0 , x 0 , y 0 ) ≤ λ 0 , for any value ε > 0, any partition ∆ δ (6), and any stochastic motion {x ω (·), y ω (·)} of complex (7), generated by the control law U = {S u , ε, ∆ δ }, the following inequality holds
for any function p * u (·) in the strategy S u and any admissible stochastic control realization v ω (·) of the second player. Lemma 2. Let functions q v = q v (t, x, z, ε) and p * v = p * v (t, x, z, ε) from the mixed strategy of the second player
Then, for any bounded subset X 0 ⊂ R n and any numbers λ * > 0 and 0 < β < 1, there exist such values λ 0 > 0 and δ > 0, that, for any initial x 0 ∈ X 0 and z 0 ∈ R n , which satisfy the condition λ(t 0 , x 0 , z 0 ) ≤ λ 0 , for any value ε > 0, any partition ∆ δ (6), and any stochastic motion {x ω (·), z ω (·)} of complex (11), generated by the control law V = {S v , ε, ∆ δ }, the following inequality holds
for any function q * v (·) in the strategy S v and any admissible stochastic control realization u ω (·) of the first player.
GAME VALUE AND (ζ, β)-OPTIMAL CONTROL LAWS CONSTRUCTION
Define a mixed control law U
Assume that all instants of time ϑ i from quality index (3) are included in the partition ∆ δ like (6), the functions p u (·) and q * u (·) satisfy condition (27) , and the function p * u (·) is determined from condition of the extremal shift (23) as follows
Similarly, define a mixed control law V 
and quality indices
The following values of the precision parameters were used in the experiment: the diameter of the partition ∆ δ of the control interval [0, 4] was δ = 0.001, pixel sizes ∆ m = ∆ l = ∆ ν = 0.01, ∆ φ = π/360. The a priori calculated value e
0 (x 0 ), which approximates the value of game (31)-(33), was equal to 0.3553, and the value e (2) 0 (x 0 ) for game (31), (32), (34) was equal to 1.050. Three control simulations were performed. In the first one, the control actions of the both players were formed according to the control laws U 
0 (x 0 ) = 1.050. In the second simulation, the control actions of the first player were formed according to U 
0 (x 0 ) = 1.050. In the third simulation, the control actions of the first player were random, the control actions of the second player were formed according to control laws V 
0 (x 0 ) = 1.050. The motion trajectories, that were obtained in the first (thick line), the second (thin line), and the third simulations (dashed line), are shown in the Fig. 1 . The first plot is related to the game with the quality index γ
(1) , the second one is for the case of the quality index γ (2) . Small circles on the trajectories show the state of the system at the instants of time of the motion quality evaluation. 
